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TIMOTHY BRIGHTBILL, JOSEPH A. LARosKI JR., TATIANA OLIVIA SULLIVAN, PABLO M.
BENTES, P. LEE SMITH, AND DAVE WHARWOOD*
I. Negotiation Developments
A. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION NEGOTIATIONS
1. Doba Round
Doha Development Round negotiations remained deadlocked on fundamental issues in
2011. In November 2011, President Obama and other G-20 leaders encouraged World
Trade Organization (WTO) members to move forward on individual pieces of the stalled
negotiations, rather than continuing to pursue a "single undertaking." They advised
WTO members to "pursue in 2012 fresh, credible approaches to furthering negotiations,
including the issues of concern for Least Developed Countries and . . . the remaining
elements of the DDA mandate."' The least-developed countries' proposals include duty-
free and quota-free treatment for their exports, services waivers, and special rules of ori-
gin. They also seek to streamline the VTO accession process.
2. Russia
Russia is on track to join the WTO in 2012. Russia is the largest economy outside the
WTO multilateral trading system. 2 Russia applied to join the WTO in 1993. The WTO
acted on Russia's accession in December 2011. Before acceding, Russia must complete its
internal ratification procedures within 220 days from the WTO Ministerial Conference's
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1. G-20 Leaders Direct WTO Members To Explore Doha 'Early Harvest' In 2012, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov.
11,2011.
2. Russia Becomes WTO Member After 18 Years of Talks, BBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/business-1 6212643.
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invitation. Russia will then formally become a WTO member thirty days after it accepts
the accession protocol.
B. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
1. Free Trade Agreements
On October 12, 2011, the U.S. Congress passed free trade agreements (FTAs) with
South Korea, Colombia, and Panama.3 The FTA with Korea will be the largest free trade
agreement for the United States since the North American Free Trade Agreement in
1993. The Korea agreement (KORUS) is expected to increase U.S. goods exports by at
least $9.7 billion. The United States exported $38.8 billion of goods to Korea in 2010.4
Colombia is the third-largest destination for U.S. exports in South America and the sec-
ond-largest market for U.S. agricultural products in that region. The Colombia agree-
ment is expected to increase U.S. goods exports by more than $1.1 billion per year. The
United States exported $12 billion in goods to Colombia in 2010.5 The Obama adminis-
tration expects that the Panama agreement will increase U.S. access to more than $15
billion in Panama infrastructure projects, including the Panama Canal expansion. 6
Implementation of the agreements may see significant delays. KORUS faces a conten-
tious Korean government approval process. Further, the U.S. administration has stated
that the Colombia agreement will not go into effect until Colombia satisfies a labor action
plan.
2. Bilateral Investment Treaties
The administration continues to review the U.S. model bilateral investment treaty
(BIT).7 The model BIT represents the core U.S. positions for investment agreement ne-
gotiations. The Obama administration has said that unresolved labor and environmental
issues are holding up completion of the review. 8 The model BIT review began in 2009.
3. See United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act,' Pub. L. No. 112-41, 125 Stat.
428 (2011); United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-43,
125 Stat. 407 (2011); United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.
112-42, 125 Stat. 462 (2011).
4. See Korea, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/japan-korea-apec/
korea (last visited Feb. 3, 2012); see also U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, OFFIcE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP.,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta (Oct. 12, 2011) (providing an over-
view and detailing the economic implications of the Korea Free Trade Agreement).
5. See Overview of the U.S.-Colombia Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF TiE U.S. TRADE RP., http://
www.ustr.gov/uscolombiatpa/facts (last visited Feb. 3, 2012) (providing an overview and detailing the eco-
nomic implications of the Colombia Free Trade Agreement).
6. See Benefits of the U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., http:/I
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/panama-trade.agreement_benefits.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2012)
(providing an overview and detailing the economic implications of the Panama Free Trade Agreement).
7. See Bilateral Investment Treaties, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agree-
ments/bilateral-investment-treaties (last visited Feb. 3, 2012).
8. See U.S., India to Hold Technical BIT Talks Despite Ongoing U.S. Internal Debate, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (uly
11, 2011), available at www.cinpr.org.br/uploadAddress/INTl2072011 [28014].pdf.
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Despite its pending review, the administration has already engaged India in technical-level
BIT negotiations. 9 All formal BIT negotiations, however, remain on hold.
3. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
On October 1, 2011, the United States, Australia, Canada, Korea, Japan, New Zealand,
Morocco, and Singapore signed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) in To-
kyo. 10 The European Union (EU), Mexico, and Switzerland did not sign, but "confirmed
their continuing... support for... the Agreement" and commitment to complete domes-
tic procedures necessary to sign the agreement.ll ACTA aims to "strengthen the interna-
tional legal framework for effectively combating global proliferation of commercial-scale
counterfeiting and piracy."' 2 The agreement "deepen[s] international cooperation and...
promote[s] strong intellectual property rights enforcement practices." 13
The United States has not yet deposited its instrument of ratification, which is the next
step for bringing the agreement into force in the United States. Final ratification of the
agreement by the United States remains under legal review with the U. S. Trade Repre-
sentative and other federal agencies.
4. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
On November 12, 2011, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States announced the completion of a frame-
work for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The framework defines an agreement to
increase trade, investment, and economic development among the TPP partner countries,
as well as promote innovation and economic growth and development.' 4 The Obama
administration said that the TPP negotiating parties aim to finalize negotiations in 2012.
The Obama administration projects that the parties could finish a legal text by the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum set for mid-2012. 5
In November 2011, Japan signaled its interest in joining the TPP. Japanese Prime
Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced that Japan would enter into consultations with cur-
rent TPP partners to explore the possibility of joining the talks.16 Canada and Mexico
9. See Indira Kannan, US Wants Progress on Civilian N-pact with India, Bus. STANDARD, Nov. 17, 2011, at
15.
10. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., http://
www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) (final text available at httpJ/www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/
i-property/pdfs/acta 1105-en.pdO.
11. Partners Sign Groundbreaking Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, OmCE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP.,
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/201 /october/partners-sign-groundbreaking-anti-
counterfeiting-t (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
12. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), supra note 10.
13. Id.
14. See Enhancing Trade and Investment, Supporting Jobs, Economic Growth and Development: Outlines of the
Tram-Pacific Partnership Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/fact-sheets/2011/november/oudines-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
15. See White House Eyes Mid-2012 TPP Deal, But Says No 'Firm Deadline' Set, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov.
18, 2011.
16. See Canada's Renewed Interest in Joining TPP Seen as Response to Japan, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 18,
2011.
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have also announced an interest in joining the TPP. The Obama administration has wel-
comed the countries' interest in TPP talks.' 7
5. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) announced a broad agreement to
slash tariffs on environmental goods to five percent or less by 2015. But the details of the
cuts were put off until next year. The APEC "Honolulu Declaration," following the fo-
rum's November 12-13, 2011 Hawaii Summit, commits members to "work to develop an
APEC list of environmental goods that directly and positively contribute to green growth
and sustainable development objectives."18
In 2011, APEC advanced its 2010 commitment to set an agenda for the Free Trade Area
of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). The agenda focuses on enhancing small and medium-sized
enterprise participation in global production chains. It also promotes a non-discrimina-
tory, market-driven innovation policy.19
II. WTO Dispute Settlement Activity
In 2011, there was a significant decline in the number of new complaints brought before
the WTO. At the time of writing, only eight disputes had been initiated in 2011, down
from twelve disputes initiated in the two previous years. 20 Five of the eight disputes initi-
ated in 2011 involved complaints under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.21 The other three
new disputes involved national treatment claims under Article Ill of the 1994 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.22
In contrast, 2011 was a very busy year in WTO dispute settlement decision-making. A
total of ten Panel Reports and five Appellate Body Reports were issued at the time of
writing, the most significant of which are discussed below. There were also significant
changes in Appellate Body composition in 2011. As of December 10, 2011, Jennifer Hill-
man (United States) and Lilia Bautista (Philippines) were replaced by Thomas Graham
(United States) and Ujal Bathia (India), respectively.
17. Id.
18. See APEC Leaders Announces Broad Agreement to Cut Tariffi on Green Goods, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov.
18, 2011.
19. See 2011 APEC Ministerial Meeting, ASIAN-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERAOnON (Nov. 11, 2011), http://
www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Ministerial-Statements/Annual/2011/201 l.amm.aspx.
20. See Chronological List of Disputes Cases, WORLD TIADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/
dispue/dispustatuse.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
21. Request for Request for Consultations by China, United States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Shrimp and Diamond Sawbladesfrom China, WT/DS422/3 (Oct. 13, 2011); Request for Consultations by the
United States, China - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler Products from the United
States, WT/DS427/1 (Sept. 20, 2011); China - Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on X-Ray Security Inspection
Equipment from the European Union, WT/DS425/1 (July 25, 2011); Request for Consultations by the Euro-
pean Union, United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Stainless Steel and Strip In Coils from Italy,
WT/DS424/1 (Apr. 1, 2011); Request for Consultation by the Republic of Korea, United States - Anti-
Dumping Measures on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Korea, WT/DS420/1 (an. 31, 2011).
22. Request for Consultations by the European Union, Canada - Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff
Program, WT/DS426/1 (Aug. 11, 2011); Request for Consultations by Moldova, Ukraine - Taxes on Distilled
Spirits, WT/DS423/1 (Mar. 2, 2011); Request for Consultations by Ukraine, Moldova - Measures Affecting
the Importation and Internal Sale of Goods (Environmental Charge), WT/DS421/1 (Feb. 17, 2011).
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A. AIRCRAFT DISPUTES
In 2011, decisions were issued in the parallel complaints involving subsidies granted by
the European Union and by the United States to their respective large civil aircraft (LCA)
industries. On May 18, 2011, the Appellate Body circulated its decision in European Com-
munities and Certain Member States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft.23
The Appellate Body largely upheld the Panel's finding that the effect of the subsidies
granted by Germany, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom for the development of
Airbus LCA was to displace Boeing LCA from the EU, Australian, Chinese, and Korean
markets and to cause significant lost sales within the meaning of Article 6.3(a), (b), and (c)
of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). But the
Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that launch aid subsidies granted by Ger-
many, Spain, and the United Kingdom for the development of the A380 were prohibited
export subsidies within the meaning of Article 3.1 (a) of the SCM Agreement. The Appel-
late Body found that the Panel articulated an incorrect standard in finding that subsidies
are de facto export contingent when they are granted because of anticipated export per-
formance. The Appellate Body reasoned that the Panel incorrectly inquired into the sub-
jective motivation of the subsidizing governments when Article 3.1(a) provides for an
objective standard for de facto export contingency. For the Appellate Body, subsidies will
be de facto export contingent when their design, structure, and modalities of operation
indicate that they are "geared to induce the promotion of future export performance by
the recipient."24 Having disagreed with the Panel's interpretation of Article 3.1(a), the
Appellate Body did not find sufficient factual findings and undisputed facts on the record
that would allow it to complete the legal analysis and determine whether launch aid subsi-
dies were geared to induce the promotion of future export performance by Airbus.
Although the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that launch aid subsidies caused
serious prejudice to U.S. interests under Articles 5(c) and 6.3(a)-(c) of the SCM Agree-
ment, its reversal of the Panel's finding that these subsidies were prohibited export subsi-
dies under Article 3.1(a) reduced the EU's implementation obligations, insofar as Article
4.7 of the SCM Agreement required the EU to "withdraw the subsidies without delay,"
whereas Article 7.8 of that Agreement merely requires it to "take appropriate steps to
remove the adverse effects" of the subsidies.25 On December 5, 2011, the EU formally
notified the United States and the Dispute Settlement Body of the steps it had taken to
implement the Panel and Appellate Body rulings in this dispute. These included the ter-
mination of launch aid programs for the A300, A3 10, A330, and A340, and the amend-
ment of certain lease agreements with respect to infrastructure provided to Airbus by the
German and Spanish governments.2 6 On December 9, the United States requested con-
sultations regarding the EU's compliance with the Panel and Appellate Body rulings.
In the parallel United States-Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft dispute, the
EU successfully challenged subsidies provided by the United States for the development
23. Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States - Measures Affecting Trade in
Large Civil Aircraft, WF/DS316/AB/R (May 18, 2011).
24. Id. T 1050-51, 1056.
25. Id. 1416.
26. Communication from the European Union, European Union and Certain Member States - Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WTI/DS316/17 (Dec. 1, 2011).
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of Boeing LCA.27 On March 31, 2011, the Panel found that NASA and Department of
Defense research and development subsidies, Foreign Sales Corporation/Extraterritorial
Income Exclusion (FSC/ETI) subsidies, and certain tax exemptions granted to Boeing by
the State of Washington and by the City of Everett, caused serious prejudice to EU inter-
ests in the form of significant price suppression, significant lost sales, and displacement
and impedance of exports from third-country markets, within the meaning of Articles 5(c)
and 6.3 (b) and (c) of the SCM Agreement. Both the EU and the United States chal-
lenged the Panel's findings on appeal, but the Appellate Body had not circulated its report
at the time of writing.
B. UNITED STATES - DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING PRODUCTION AND
COUNTrERVAMLING DUims
On March 11, 2011, the Appellate Body circulated its Report in United States - Defini-
tive Anti-Dumping Production and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China.28
Although the Appellate Body upheld most of the Panel's findings rejecting China's "as
applied" challenges against the four sets of final anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing
duties (CVD) determinations at issue, the Appellate Body reversed two very significant
findings made by Panel. First, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that "any
entity controlled by a government" was a "public body" within the meaning of Article
1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. 29 The Appellate Body reasoned that majority share
ownership per se does not establish that an entity is a "public body." Rather, a "public
body" is an entity that "possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority." 30
The Appellate Body went on to find that the USDOC failed to establish that certain state-
owned enterprises and state-owned banks were a "public body" within the meaning of
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement in the four CVD investigations at issue.
Second, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that the concurrent imposition
of AD duties based on a non-market economy methodology and CVD duties were not
prohibited by the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body found that the imposition of
"double remedies," i.e., the offsetting of the same instances of subsidization twice through
the concurrent imposition of AD and CVD duties, was inconsistent with the requirement
in Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement that CVD duties be levied "in the appropriate
amounts in each case." 31
C. TECHI-CAL BARRIERS TO TRADE DispuTEs
In 2011, three different Panel Reports - United States - Measures Affecting the Produc-
tion and Sale of Clove Cigarettes,32 United States - Measures Concerning the Importation, Mar-
27. Panel Report, United States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WTI DS353/R (Mar. 31,
2011).
28. Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping Production and Countervailing Duties on
Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011).
29. Id. 320-22.
30. Id. T 317.
31. Id. 1 550-53.
32. Panel Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/
R (Sept. 2, 2011).
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keting and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products,33 and United States - Certain Country of Origin
Labelling (COOL) Requirements34 - addressed the consistency of U.S. measures with the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). All three Panels applied
the three-tier test articulated by the Appellate Body in EC-Asbestos and EC-Sardines, ac-
cording to which measures are "technical regulations" within the meaning of Article 1.2
and Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement if they: (i) apply to an identifiable product or
group of products; (ii) lay down one or more characteristics of the product; and (iii) are
mandatory. Although the three Panels concluded that the measures at issue were "techni-
cal regulations" subject to the disciplines of the TBT Agreement, one panelist in
U.S.-Tunall dissented on this point. Whilst the majority found that the relevant regula-
tion was "mandatory" because it regulated the binding requirements for certification of
tuna as "dolphin-safe," the dissenting panelist opined that such regulation was not
"mandatory" because it did not prohibit the sale of tuna not certified as "dolphin-safe" in
the United States. 35
The Panels took different approaches in their interpretation of the national treatment
provision of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. The Panels in U.S.-Tuna II and
U.S.-COOL applied a competition-type of analysis similar to that applicable under Article
EI:4 of the GATT 1994 to determine whether the imported and domestic products were
"like" within the meaning of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. The Panel in U.S.-Clove
Cigarettes considered it inappropriate to approach the question of "likeness" primarily
from a competition perspective because in its view particular significance should be at-
tached to the legitimate public health objective of the technical regulation at issue.36 The
Panels in U.S.-Clove and in U.S.-COOL found that the technical regulations at issue vio-
lated Article 2.1 because they accorded to imported products treatment that is less
favorable than that applied to domestic like products. In contrast, the Panel in U.S.-Tuna
/I found that the United States did not act inconsistently with Article 2.1 because the
requirements for "dolphin-safe" certification were origin-neutral and therefore did not
accord to Mexican tuna "treatment less favorable" than that accorded to like U.S. tuna.37
The Panels also reached different conclusions under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement,
which requires that technical regulations not be more trade restrictive than necessary to
flulfill a legitimate objective. Applying a GATT Article XX-type analysis, the Panel in
U.S.-Clove Cigarettes found that the United States did not act inconsistently with Article
2.2, because Indonesia had failed to demonstrate that the United States' ban on clove
cigarettes did not materially contribute to the legitimate objective of reducing youth
smoking, and that there were less trade-restrictive alternatives that would make an
equivalent contribution towards such objective.38 In contrast, the Panels in U.S.-COOL
33. Panel Report, United States - Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna
Produes, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011).
34. Panel Report, United States- Certain Counny of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/R,
WTIDS386/R (Nov. 18, 2011).
.35. United States - Measures Concerning The Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, supra
note 33, 1 7.143-45, 7.184-86.
36. United States - Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, supra note 32, 1] 7.119.
37. United States - Measures Concerning The Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, supra
note 33, T 7.378.
38. United States -Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, supra note 32, at 9 7.431-
32.
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and U.S.-TunaII found that the United States acted inconsistently with Article 2.2. The
Panel in U.S.-COOL found that the technical regulation at issue did not fulfill its stated
objective of providing consumers with information on the country of origin of meat prod-
ucts, and therefore did not proceed to determine further whether such measure was "more
trade-restrictive than necessary" to achieve those objectives. 39 The Panel in U.S.-Tunall
found that the "dolphin-safe" labeling requirements were more trade restrictive than nec-
essary to achieve the objective of ensuring consumers that tuna was caught using a method
that did not adversely affect dolphins. The Panel reasoned that the U.S. labeling require-
ments only partially fulfilled that objective, because the "dolphin-safe" labeling require-
ments only ensured that tuna was not caught using setting on dolphins but did not address
incidental risks of death or injury to dolphins resulting from other tuna-fishing methods.0
Moreover, the Panel found that Mexico's proposed less trade-restrictive alternative of us-
ing the "dolphin-safe" label under the Agreement on International Dolphin Conservation
Program, to which both the United States and Mexico are a part, would achieve a level of
protection equivalent to that achieved by the U.S. measures. 41
At the time of writing, the Panel Reports in U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, U.S.-Tuna II, and
U.S.-COOL had not yet been appealed.
m. U.S. Trade Remedies
A. COMMERCE'S RULEMAKING PuRsuANT To PRESIDENT OBAMA's NATIONAL
EXPORT INITIATIVE
In support of the National Export Initiative (NEI),42 which calls for U.S. exports to
double over the next five years, the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) an-
nounced on August 26, 2010 a Trade Law Enforcement Package to strengthen the admin-
istration of U.S. trade remedy laws.43 The package included proposals that were either
implemented or proposed in 2011, and which address a range of issues that have arisen in
the course of trade remedy proceedings.
B. FINAL ANNOUNCEMENTS FOR ENFORCEMENT INriATWVEs AND CHANGES IN
PRACTICE
1. Requirement for Cash Deposits for Entries after Preliminary Determinations
Pursuant to the NEI, Commerce amended 19 C.F.R. § 351.205 governing the security
required following an affirmative preliminary determination in antidumping or counter-
39. United States - Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, supra note 34, It 7.716-19.
40. United States - Measures Concerning The Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, supra
note 33, 9 7.561-62.
41. Id. 9 7.578.
42. See Exec. Order No. 13534, 75 Fed. Reg. 12433 (Mar. 11, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/executive-order-national-export-initiative.
43. See NATIONAL EXPORT INrIATrVE, NEI TRADE LAW ENFORCEMENT PACKAGE (2010), available at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/lei/fachsheet-dei-20101108.pdf.
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vailing duty (AD/CVD) proceedings. 44 U.S. trade remedy laws provide that when Com-
merce makes a preliminary determination in an AD/CVD investigation, it "shall order the
posting of a cash deposit, bond, or other security ... for each entry of the subject mer-
chandise . . . "45 Commerce's regulations previously provided that the remedy (some-
times called "provisional measures") would usually take the form of a bonding
requirement to ensure payment if duties were imposed.46 Commerce's amendment clari-
fied that these provisional measures will take the form of cash deposits.
47
According to Commerce, the amendment seeks to make importers (rather than bonding
companies) directly responsible for paying the duties48 to "help to ensure that the U.S.
Government collects the full amount of the duties owed should an investigation result in
the imposition" of an order, and to reduce the burdens that U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (Customs) faces collecting AD/CVDs.49
2. New Factual Certification Requirements
Any person providing information to Commerce during an AD/CVD proceeding must
certify to the accuracy and completeness of such information.50 On January 26, 2004,
Commerce published a notice to inquire whether the current certification requirements
were sufficient to protect the integrity of its administrative processes. 5S
In February 2011, Commerce published its interim final rule and requested additional
comments. 52 According to Commerce, the amended regulation,
strengthens the certification requirement by requiring parties to identify the submission
to which the certification applies; to identify to which segment of an AD/CVD proceeding
the certification applies; to identify who is making the certification; to indicate the date on
which the certification was made; and to make clear that parties and their representatives
are subject to serious consequences for false certifications. 53
Commerce received comments on the interim final rule regarding the appropriateness
of requiring foreign governments and their officials to submit a certification.
54 Com-
merce determined that it needed additional time to respond to these comments and cur-
rently allows foreign government officials to submit certifications in either the current or
the prior format. 55
44. Modification of Regulations Regarding the Practice of Accepting Bonds During the Provisional Mea-
sures Period in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations, 76 Fed. Reg. 61042 (Oct. 3, 2011) (to
be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 351).
45. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671b(d)(1)(B) (2006); 19 U.S.C.. § 1673b(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
46. 19 C.F.R. § 351.205(a) (2011).
47. See Modification of Regulations, supra note 44.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677m(b) (2006) (Commerce's regulations set forth the requirements of the factual certi-
fication); 19 C.F.R. § 351.303(g) (2011).
51. See Notice of Inquiry, 69 Fed. Reg. 3562 (Jan. 26, 2004).
52. Certification of Factual Information to Import Administration During Antidumping and Counter-
vailing Duty Proceedings, 76 Fed. Reg. 7491 (Feb. 10, 2011) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 351).
53. Id. at 7498.
54. Id. at 7492.
55. Id.
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3. Labor Calculation Methodology in NME Proceedings
Commerce amended its methodology for calculating the surrogate labor rate in non-
market economy (NME) proceedings.5 6 The amendment addressed the ruling by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in Dorbest Ltd. v. United States,5 7 which
invalidated 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(3) governing Commerce's labor rate calculation.58 Be-
cause of Dorbest, Commerce no longer relies on the wage rate methodology described in
its regulations.
Commerce's prior practice was to rely on labor data from numerous surrogate coun-
tries. After reviewing the comments, Commerce determined that "using the data on in-
dustry-specific wages from a primary surrogate country is the best approach for valuing
the labor input in NME antidumping duty proceedings," because it is consistent with
Commerce's methodology to value all other factors of production and because it results in
the use of a uniform basis for FOP valuation - a single surrogate.5 9
4. Application of the N E-Wide Rate to Suspended Entries
In June 2011, Commerce proposed to modify its current practice for the assessment of
AD duties "where merchandise from a non-reviewed exporter enters the United States at
the cash-deposit rate of an exporter subject to review but where the basis for that cash
deposit rate is not consistent with information subsequently reported to [Commerce] dur-
ing an administrative ,review." 60 Commerce explained that there have been instances
where importers unfairly "benefitted from an exporter's previously-established cash-de-
posit rate," even though it was subsequently demonstrated that the identified exporter's
rate "was not appropriate."61 Commerce's modification "is intended to prevent non-re-
viewed exporters in NME cases from benefitting from the rates of other exporters" and to
"ensure that entries are liquidated at the appropriate rate."62
In AD proceedings, Commerce establishes a cash deposit rate for each company subject
to the investigation or review. In NME cases, if an exporter does not receive a separate
rate, the NME-wide rate applies as the cash deposit rate. Commerce's prior practice re-
garding merchandise entered under an exporter's separate rate, but not reported to Com-
merce, was to instruct Customs to liquidate those entries at the cash deposit rate at the
time of entry.63 After reviewing the comments, Commerce determined that it would in-
56. See Change in Methodology Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,092 (June 21, 2011).
57. See Dorbest Ltd. v. United States, 604 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
58. 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(3) (1997) (providing "Iflor labor, the Secretary will use regression-based rates
reflective of the observed relationship between wages and national income in market economy countries.
The Secretary will calculate the wage rate to be applied in nonmarket economy proceedings each year. The
calculation will be based on current data, and will be made available to the public.").
59. See Change in Methodology Notice, supra note 56, at 36,093. Commerce also determined to use Inter-
national Labor Organization (ILO) Yearbook Chapter 6A as its primary source of labor cost data in NME
antidumping proceedings, rather than Chapter 5B of the ILO yearbook, because Chapter 6A data reflects all
costs related to labor including wages, benefits, housing, training, etc., and Chapter 5B data reflects only
direct compensation and bonuses.
60. Request for Comments Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,046 (June 10, 2011).
61. Id. at 34,047.
62. Id.
63. See Policy Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. 65,694 (Oct. 24, 2011).
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struct Customs "to apply the NME-wide rate to entries suspended at a reviewed exporter's
rate, but which are not reported to or reviewed by [Commerce]." 64 The effect of this
refinement will be to limit the underpayment of AD duties and to serve as a disincentive
for importers to incorrectly identify the exporter on the entry documentation.
C. PROPOSALS WrrHouT A FNAL RUtLE
1. Revocation of Orders
On March 21, 2011, Commerce published a proposed modification to eliminate its regu-
lations regarding revocation of AD/CVD orders with respect to individual exporters or
producers who demonstrate de minimis levels of dumping or subsidies for three consecu-
tive years.65 Commerce recognized that company-specific revocations are not required by
the Act,66 and that only a small fraction of the companies reviewed by Commerce is eligi-
ble. Commerce received comments regarding this proposal, but as of the end of 2011
Commerce has not published a final rule.
2. Reduction of U.S. Price in NME Proceedings
Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(B), Commerce is directed to reduce an exporter's
U.S. price by "the amount, if included in such price, of any export tax, duty, or other
charge imposed by the exporting country on the exportation of the subject merchandise to
the United States, other than an export tax, duty, or other charge described in section
[1677(6)(C) of this tide]." 67
Commerce did not apply this provision in NME antidumping proceedings "because
pervasive government intervention in NMEs precluded proper valuation of taxes paid by
NME respondents to NME governments."68 Commerce has since changed its practice
with respect to the application of the CVD law to China and Vietnam (both NMEs).
Commerce has ruled that it can determine whether these governments "have bestowed an
identifiable and measurable benefit upon a producer, and whether the benefit is specific,
including certain measures related to taxation." 69 As a result, Commerce has proposed to
reduce the U.S. price used in NME antidumping calculations by any export tax, duty, or
other charge imposed by the Chinese and Vietnamese governments. 70 Commerce has
received comments, but it has not implemented this proposal.
3. Respondent Selection and Sampling
When a large number of exporters/producers participate in an AD proceeding, it can
become impractical for Commerce to calculate individual AD margins for each respon-
dent. Commerce has statutory authority to limit its examination to (1) "a sample of ex-
64. Id.
65. See Proposed Modification to Regulation Concerning the Revocation of Antidumping and Counter-
vailing Duty Orders, 76 Fed. Reg. 15,233 (Mar. 21, 2011) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 351).
66. Id.
67. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677a(c)(2)(B) (2012).
68. Public Comment Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. 4866 (Jan. 27, 2011).
69. Id. at 4867.
70. Id.
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porters, producers, or types of products that is statistically valid based on the information
available to the administering authority at the time of selection" or (2) "exporters and
producers accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise from the export-
ing country that can be reasonably examined." 71 Commerce, however, has used the sec-
ond option "in virtually every one of its proceedings." 72 Consequently, "companies under
investigation or review with relatively smaller import volumes have typically not been
selected by the Department for individual examination." 73 Commerce has proposed to
select respondents by employing "a sampling technique that (1) is random, (2) is stratified,
and (3) uses probability-proportional-to-size (PPS) samples." 74 In its proposal, Com-
merce listed those circumstances in which it would forego sampling and continue to re-
view the largest companies by import volume.75 Commerce received comments regarding
this proposal, but it has not published a final rule adopting this regulatory amendment.
4. De Facto Criteria for Establishing a Separate Rate
In AD proceedings involving NME countries, Commerce starts with a rebuttable pre-
sumption that all export activities in the country are under the control of the government
and that all exporters should receive a single countrywide AD rate.76 An individual ex-
porter, however, can qualify for a separate rate by demonstrating that it is sufficiently free
from government control over its export activities. This determination is made through
Commerce's "separate-rate test," which incorporates both de facto and de jure elements.77
Commerce published a notice seeking public comment on whether additional criteria
should be considered when determining if there is a de facto absence of government con-
trol over an exporter.78 To evaluate whether a respondent is subject to de facto govern-
ment control, Commerce currently considers four factors: (1) government control of
export prices; (2) contract negotiation and execution independent from the government;
(3) autonomy from the government in the selection of management; and (4) retention of
proceeds from export sales and independent decisions regarding profits or losses. Com-
merce recognized that its "current practice focuses on direct government involvement in a
firm's export activities and, to that extent, it may not take sufficient account of the govern-
ment's role in the NME and how that role may impact an exporter's behavior with regard
to its export activities and setting prices." 79 Commerce stated that it is considering modi-
fying the de facto criteria to look beyond direct government control of export activities.
Commerce received numerous comments but has not analyzed these comments or pub-
lished a final rule.
71. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677f-l(c)(2) (2012).
72. Public Comment Notice, 75 Fed. Reg. 78,678 (Dec. 16, 2010).
73. Id. The exception is Change Notice, 71 Fed. Reg. 66,304 (Nov. 14, 2006), where Commerce selected
respondents by sampling.
74. Public Comment Notice, supra note 72.
75. Id.
76. Peer Bearing Co. v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1325 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2008).
77. Request for Comments Notice, 75 Fed. Reg. 78,676 (Dec. 16, 2010).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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D. TENSIONS BETWEEN COMMERCE AND THE GovERNMENT OF CHINA IN CVD
PROCEEDINGS
The Government of China (GOC) has opposed the simultaneous application of the
NME AD methodology and the CVD law since Commerce first conducted simultaneous
investigations on Coated Free Sheet Paper from China in 2006.80 Notwithstanding this
opposition, the GOC - like all other governments - is required to respond to Com-
merce questionnaires in any CVD proceeding. Refusal to provide complete or accurate
information by a foreign government can result in an adverse determination for that coun-
try's exporters and producers.
Although the GOC has participated in CVD investigations, its degree of cooperation in
those investigations has been called into question. Commerce's Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary (DAS) of Import Administration in August 2011 sent an unprecedented letter to the
GOC's Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports regarding the GOC's participation
in CVD investigations and its submission of "questionable information." In that letter,
the DAS stated the following:
[A] motivation for amending the current regulations [regarding factual certifications]
comes, in part, from recent cases where [Commerce] determined that certain Chinese
interested parties, including the government, submitted questionable information
during the course of a proceeding. For example, in the Circular Welded Carbon
Quality Steel Pipe CVD investigation, the Government of China (GOC) officials
misreported the source of the information on whether hot-rolled steel producers
were privately or state owned. Also, in the Laminated Woven Sacks CVD investiga-
tion, Shandong Department of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and
Shandong Development and Reform Commission officials denied the existence of a
Shandong five-year plan for textiles and, when presented with evidence of its exis-
tence, claimed it was prepared by another agency without their knowledge ....
[T]hese examples reflect questionable information submitted by GOC officials dur-
ing CVD proceedings. There are numerous other examples of outright misrepresen-
tations on the part of Chinese company officials involved in both AD and CVD
proceedings.Sl
It is rare for Commerce to admonish publicly a foreign government for its failure to
provide complete and accurate information in numerous proceedings.
In other proceedings, the GOC has refused to respond to questionnaires from Com-
merce. In the first administrative review of the CVD order on New Pneumatic Off-the-
road Tires from China, the GOC did not respond to any questionnaire issued by Com-
80. Memorandum from Stephen J. Clayes, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Imp. Admin. on the Final Deter-
mination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet from the People's Republic of
China, to David M. Spooner, Assistant Sec'y for Imp. Admin., cmt. 1 (Oct. 17, 2007); Memorandum from
Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Imp. Admin. on the Final Determination in the Less-Than-
Fair-Value Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic of China, to David M.
Spooner, Assistant Sec'y for Imp. Admin., cmt. 1 (Oct. 25, 2007).
81. See Letter from Ronald Lorentzen, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Imp. Admin., to Zhou Xiaoyan, Dir.
Gen., Bureau of Fair Trade for Imp. and Exp., Ministry of Commerce, The People's Republic of China (Aug.
5, 2011) (submitted to the record of the Galvanized Steel Wire from the People's Republic of China CVD
investigation in Aug. 9, 2011, Memorandum to The File).
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merce. Rather, the GOC "submitted a document that was argumentative and which
merely stated that 'it makes little sense to submit detailed answers to the questions set
forth in the Commerce Department Questionnaire at this time."' 8 2 Commerce issued
additional questionnaires to the GOC and stated that the GOC's submissions "amount to
little more than the venting of grievances against [Commerce] and cannot reasonably be
considered proper questionnaire responses. They are, in fact, outright refusals even to
attempt to respond to [Commerce's] requests for information."8 3
Neither Commerce, nor the GOC, has changed its position on this issue. Short of
Commerce discontinuing its application of the CVD law or applying market economy AD
methodologies to China, it is likely that the tensions between Commerce and the GOC in
trade remedy proceedings-will continue.
E. RECENT INCREASE IN CIRCUMVENTION INVESTIGATIONS
Circumvention inquiries increased during 2011, as compared to prior years. During
2011, Commerce initiated five anti-circumvention inquiries.84 By comparison, four anti-
circumvention inquiries were initiated in 2009 and 2010 combined.85 The recent influx of
circumvention inquiries follows the CAFC's decision in Target Corp. v. United States and
Commerce's decision in Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from China.
In Target Corp., the CAFC confirmed Commerce's findings in an anti-circumvention
inquiry regarding Petroleum Wax Candles from China.86 The CAFC ruled that Com-
merce's interpretation of "later-developed"-whether the merchandise was commercially
available at the time of the AD investigation-was reasonable. The CAFC also deter-
mined that scope rulings pursuant to scope inquiries do not control anti-circumvention
findings involving the same merchandise.8 7 In addition, the CAFC stated that it had pre-
viously "recognized that merchandise that might otherwise fall outside the literal scope of
the order may be included within the scope pursuant to [an anti-circumvention scope
finding]." 8 8
In Carbon Steel Plate from China, Commerce determined that steel plate with addi-
tional trace amounts of boron were within the scope of the order.8 9 In that case, Com-
merce recognized that it must "apply practical measurements regarding minor
alternations, so that circumvention can be dealt with effectively, even where such altera-
tions to an article technically transform it into a differently designated article."90
82. Invitation for Comment Notice, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,268, 64,272 (Oct. 19, 2010).
83. Id.
84. Inquiry Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. 50,173 (Aug. 12, 2011); Inquiry Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,218 (June 8,
2011); Inquiry Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,791 (Apr. 28, 2011); Inquiry Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,910 (Mar. 18,
2011); Inquiry Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,243 (May 6, 2011).
85. Inquiry Notice, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,352 (Oct. 28, 2010); Inquiry Notice, 75 Fed. Reg. 42,685 (July 22,
2010); Inquiry Notice, 75 Fed. Reg. 21,241 (Apr. 23, 2010); Inquiry Notice, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,127 (Apr. 5,
2010).
86. Target Corp. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Final Determination
Notice, 71 Fed. Reg. 59,075 (Oct. 6, 2006).
87. Target Corp., 609 F.3d at 1363.
88. Id. at 1362 (ciing Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
89. Preliminary Determination Notice, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,991 (July 14, 2009); Publication Notice, 74 Fed.
Reg. 40,565 (Aug. 12, 2009).
90. Id.
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In June 2011, Commerce initiated a minor alteration anti-circumvention inquiry to de-
termine whether wire rod with a diameter measuring between 4.75 mm and 5.00 mm is
subject to the relevant AD order.91 In its initiation notice, Commerce recognized that
small-diameter wire rod (e.g., rod with diameters as narrow as 4.2 mm) was commercially
available prior to the filing of the petition.92 Generally, the minor alterations provision is
applied to merchandise that was not commercially available at the time of the original
petition. Here, the existence of small-diameter wire rod at the time of the petition did not
prohibit the minor alteration anti-circumvention inquiry from being initiated.
Target Corp. and Carbon Steel Plate from China provided clarification on Commerce's
interpretation of the anti-circumvention provisions and judicial support for that interpre-
tation. In addition, the initiation of the anti-circumvention inquiry in Wire Rod from
Mexico indicates that Commerce may continue to expand the reach of its anti-circumven-
tion provisions.
91. Inquiry Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,218 (June 8, 2011)
92. Id. at 33,219.
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